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THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF ASSUMPTION OF
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
David Hahn*
Executory contracts are a pivotal element of bankruptcy, forming
some of the most vital economic values for a debtor’s business. Bankruptcy
law allows a trustee to choose whether to assume an executory contract or
to reject it. While this is well-settled statutory law, the theoretical
foundations of assumption have been discussed rather sparingly. This
paper aims to fill this gap by offering an analytical framework for the
concept of assumption.
The paper explores the theoretical justifications for termination of a
contract by an injured party upon its breach by the other party. It argues
that the two primary justifications are the concern about recurring
breaches and deterrence against potential breachers. I contend that both
justifications lose force in the context of insolvency and bankruptcy and
thus assumption of executory contracts is warranted. The judicial
oversight in bankruptcy reduces the likelihood of recurring breaches. The
deterrence rationale is relevant with respect to willful breaches, but less
applicable with respect to no-fault, insolvency-related breaches. However,
identifying the nature of a specific breach is practically difficult and
lengthy. Given this difficulty on one hand and the importance of executory
contracts to a debtor’s reorganization on the other, I argue that bankruptcy
law is correct in curtailing the injured party’s termination rights and
substituting them with a monetary remedy. That remedy is curing past
defaults.
The paper defends the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement of curing past
defaults prior to assumption. I show that this prerequisite is justified both
in debtor friendly and in creditor friendly bankruptcy regimes. In the
former regime, curing past defaults combats the moral hazard of willful
breaches. In the latter, it reflects a matter of fairness. According effective
priority to the non-debtor party is defensible because that party is the only
* Senior Lecturer, Bar-Ilan University School of Law, Israel; J.S.D., NYU School of
Law. I am grateful to Abraham Bell, Tsilly Dagan, Moshe Gelbard, Assaf Hamdani,
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claimant which is being legally compelled to perform future obligations to
the debtor.
Finally, the paper discusses the roles of the bankruptcy courts in
reviewing the assumption of executory contracts. I call for subjecting the
priority status of the non-debtor party to the court’s discretion. The courts
should take into account that party’s bona fide adherence to the terms of
the contract during the bankruptcy case prior to upholding its priority
status with respect to the payment of past contractual defaults.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Executory contracts form an ongoing relationship between the parties
so that at the time one party files for bankruptcy, the contract encompasses
past and future obligations and rights between the parties.1 The fate of an
executory contract may prove significant for the parties. The contract may
represent an expected gain or an expected loss to the debtor. Consequently,
its performance may enhance or impair the debtor’s value and, derivatively,
the ultimate return to the creditors.
Bankruptcy law addresses the important matter of executory contracts
and provides for the assumption or rejection of such contracts.2 The right
of the debtor to assume an executory contract circumscribes the non-debtor
party’s contract-law right to rescind that previously-breached contract.
The lengthy, detailed statutory provision has drawn the attention of
commentators over the years. The literature on executory contracts has
focused primarily on the interpretative aspects of the statute and has
discussed also the notion of rejection of an executory contract.3
Somewhat surprisingly, the trustee’s right to assume the contract,4 and
1. The relevant definition of executory contracts, occasionally put into question and
yet almost uniformly recognized and adhered to by bankruptcy courts, is still the one
proffered by Vern Countryman: ―[A] contract under which the obligation of both the
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of
the other.‖ Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 460 (1973). Jay Westbrook has suggested abolishing the executoriness test and
applying the bankruptcy rules to all uncompleted contracts. Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989).
2. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
3. See, e.g., Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
“Rejection,‖ 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988) (focusing on the rejection of an executory
contract); Jesse Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46
DUKE L.J. 517 (1996) (analyzing treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy); George
G. Triantis, The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and
Adjustment, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 679 (1993) [hereinafter Triantis I] (noting the trustee’s
rights, including assumption, in bankruptcy); Westbrook, supra note 1.
4. For the purpose of brevity this article will use the term ―trustee‖ as including both a
trustee in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and the debtor-in-possession
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more specifically, the theoretical foundation underlying this right, has been
relatively overlooked in the literature. Whether a trustee should be entitled
to assume a previously breached contract, and if so, under what conditions,
are questions which to date have been barely analyzed.
This article aims to enrich the literature on assumption of executory
contracts and establish an analytical framework for its understanding. The
contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it refutes simplistic contract
law arguments supporting the termination of a contract breached by an
insolvent debtor. The article argues that the rationales underlying the
remedy lose force in the environment of insolvency and bankruptcy. Thus,
curtailing the termination of pre-bankruptcy breached executory contracts
and facilitating their continuance is normatively justified. Secondly, the
paper offers a normative justification for the Bankruptcy Code’s
requirement that assumption of executory contracts be preceded with the
curing of past defaults. It explains the curing of past default as a gentler
alternative to termination of the contract. Given the importance of
executory contracts to the successful reorganization of a debtor, this
alternative is more adequate.
Finally, this article offers an amendment of the current law on
executory contracts. The article calls for authorizing a bankruptcy judge,
upon assumption of the contract, to deny the non-debtor party payments for
pre-bankruptcy breaches it has suffered in circumstances where that party
stalled and did not cooperate with the debtor party during the bankruptcy
case. This would encourage and incentivize non-debtor parties to perform
their obligations under an executory contract in good faith. As a result, it
may enhance the value of such contracts for the debtor and its creditors as a
whole.
This article continues as follows. Part II examines the rationales
underlying the remedy of rescission upon a breach of contract. It discusses
two primary rationales. The first is the need to protect the non-breaching
party from the potential of recurring breaches by the breaching party. The
second rationale is ex ante deterrence against potential breachers.
Part III will examine the survival of executory contracts through the
lens of insolvency and bankruptcy. This part will first establish the
importance of executory contracts to the overall operation of a debtor’s
business and its chances of successful reorganization. Subsequently, it
shall challenge the right of termination in bankruptcy and argue that it
should be qualified. To support this argument, I will show that the two
underlying rationales of termination are relatively weak in the context of
insolvency and bankruptcy.

under Chapter 11 thereto. See also Bankruptcy Code § 1101(1) (defining a debtor in
possession).

HAHNFINALIZED_FOUR (DO NOT DELETE)

726

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

4/28/2011 7:35 PM

[Vol. 13:3

The concern about recurring breaches is mitigated as a result of the
superseding of the debtor’s management by a court-appointed trustee or by
the bankruptcy court’s oversight over the operations of the debtor in the
case.
The deterrence rationale is less applicable with respect to no-fault
breaches. In a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime it is likely that most
breaches upon insolvency will be no-fault breaches. In a debtor-friendly
bankruptcy regime breaches may also be a result of opportunistic, willful
behavior of the debtor. It would be lengthy and costly to litigate and
differentiate between the different types of breaches. Thus, an overinclusive remedy is more practical.
Given the importance of executory contracts to the policy of
bankruptcy on one hand and the irreversibility of termination on the other,
Part III concludes that a softer alternative is preferable—qualifying the
termination of the contract, subject to the requirement that the debtor cure
its past defaults prior to assumption.
Part IV follows and examines closely the curing of past defaults as a
prerequisite for assumption of an executory contract. The discussion
supports this requirement both in debtor-friendly and in creditor-friendly
bankruptcy regimes. In the former, curing past defaults combats moral
hazard. In the latter, curing past defaults is a matter of fairness and is in
accord with bankruptcy law’s distributional policy. A party to an
executory contract is the only person compelled to actively continue its
ongoing relationship with the debtor. This idiosyncratic position justifies
according special protection to that party, including the curing of past
breaches.
Finally, Part V focuses on timing and priority. With respect to timing,
it supports the Bankruptcy Code’s delaying of the trustee’s decision
whether to assume an executory contract to an advanced phase in the
administration of the bankruptcy case. To facilitate assumption, at the
inception of the case the non-debtor party must be subjected to the
automatic stay. As for priority, it is hereby suggested that despite the defacto priority the non-debtor party enjoys upon assumption of the contract
by the debtor, this priority ought to be discretionally qualified by a
bankruptcy court. Whenever the non-debtor party stalls its performance of
the contract in bad faith during the administration of the case, prior to
assumption, the judge may order that its entitlement for payments curing
past defaults will lose priority and be paid as an unsecured claim. Giving
this power to the bankruptcy court will properly incentivize the non-debtor
party to carry forward the contract uninterrupted for the benefit of the
debtor and its creditors as a whole.
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THE RATIONALE OF TERMINATION

Assume that prior to the commencement of its insolvency case the
debtor defaults on a payment and thereby breaches its contract with another
party. In most contracts, non-payment by a purchaser of a product or
service is defined as a material breach, entitling the non-breaching party to
terminate the contract.5 The basic premise of contract law is that when
there has been a fundamental breach of contract, the only party which
deserves the support and protection of the law is the party injured by the
breach.6 Contract law affords the non-breaching party the right to seek the
remedy of its choice and, subject to certain doctrines, will grant its wish.
The non-breaching party can compel the breaching party to perform the
contract by means of an order of enforcement or it can choose to terminate
the contract, sever its legal relations with the breaching party, and collect
damages. From the perspective of contract law, termination of the contract
by the non-breaching party is an appropriate and justifiable action.
This part examines the underlying rationale justifying the remedy of
rescission upon the breach of a contract. Theoretically, one may fathom
that contract law would limit the rights of the non-breaching party to
monetary damages to make it whole, yet compel it to perform its
unperformed obligations under the contract nonetheless. The remedy of
termination would not be sanctioned under the law at all. But contract law
does provide the non-breaching party the right to terminate. The
justification of this remedy is pertinent to executory contracts. These
contracts entail a number of stages of performance by each of the parties to
the contract. Termination of the contract prevents the creation of any
economic value that potentially exists in its subsequent stages.
To be sure, in contracts where each of the parties is required to
comply with one obligation only, for example, where a person sells a parcel
of land to another, non-performance of an obligation by one party is
inextricably linked to the obligation owed to it by the other party.
5. See Canefield v. Reynolds, 631 F.2d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (declining to extend
the remedy of rescission to the non-breaching party in circumstances of non-material
breach); see also Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of
Contracts, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1988) (setting forth the criteria that
distinguish material breach from any other breach of contract).
6. The copious literature dealing with breaches is overwhelmingly focused on the
rights, remedies, and damages of the non-breaching party, whereas the ramifications of the
breach on the breaching party are mostly ignored. The classic expression of the courts’
indifference towards the interests of the breaching party is Justice Harris’ famous statement
that ―If he (the promisor,- DH) has engaged . . . he cannot . . . innocently depart from his
contract. If he fails to perform when the requirement is plain, and when he can perform if
he will, he has no right to call upon the court to make a new contract for him; nor ought he
to complain if the law leaves him without remedy.‖ Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173, 203-04
(1858).
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Accordingly, in a contract which requires one-time performance of an
obligation, it is clear that non-performance on the part of the breaching
party will also relieve the non-breaching party, which has been injured by
the breach, from performing its contractual obligation.7 The focus of the
discussion herein is thus executory contracts that require ongoing
performance from both parties.
The remedy of rescission may be justified either as a measure of
protection against further breach of the contract or as an ex ante deterrence
against breach of contract. These justifications are discussed below.
A.

Protection against Further Breach

In light of the infringement already committed by the breaching party,
there is a higher probability that this party will breach the contract again in
the future. In other words, the current breach may indicate a desire or
propensity on the part of the breaching party to not comply with the terms
of the contract it has undertaken. Accordingly, the law seeks to protect the
non-breaching party and safeguard it against a further breach which the
breaching party may commit and thereby cause it additional damage in the
future.8 The remedy of rescission is the legal method for sparing the nonbreaching party, in advance, any exposure to future breaches of the contract
by the breaching party. It places a cap on the losses suffered by the nonbreaching party based on the current breach.
B.

Ex ante Deterrence against Breach

Another possible reason for the remedy of rescission is that severing
the relations between the contracting parties henceforth may act as an
efficient deterrent to potential breaching parties and cause them to
reconsider prior to breaching. If a potential breaching party knows, prior to
committing the breach, that the breach will preclude it from enjoying the
future benefits of the contract, it will think twice before committing the
breach. Every potential breaching party must realize that its action will
require it not only to compensate the injured party for the past breach, but
7. This statement is also true where the contract has been breached by reason of
insolvency. Thus, for example, if prior to becoming insolvent, the insolvent party entered
into a contract for the purchase of property from another party, the receiver cannot ask the
other party to transfer the property or title thereof to him without paying the full contractual
consideration in exchange. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 565 (3d
ed. 2004); SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §45:18 (4th ed. 2009).
8. Barry E. Adler, The Law of Last Resort, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1661, 1670 (2002).
This rationale is particularly pertinent to the doctrine of anticipatory breach. Roehm v.
Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 19 (1990); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:1,
14:33 (2009).
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also to forfeit future profits which it seeks to gain from the contract.
In response to the fear of an efficient breach of a contract, a nonbreaching party is entitled to augmented damages, which will deprive the
breaching party of any alternative profit that it might otherwise have gained
from its calculated repudiation of the contract.9 That is, the law prevents
the potential breaching party from benefiting from its own calculated
actions which run afoul with the fundamental norm of contract law – to
keep good one’s legal promise. Yet the remedy of augmented damages
fails to deter a party from committing a calculated breach in circumstances
where it is interested in continuing the performance of the breached
contract. For example, damages alone may not deter a lessee from not
paying its monthly rent in circumstances where the lessee is interested in
continuing to use the leased property. An award of damages merely
compels it to pay what is required of it in the first place under the original
lease.10 In the absence of the remedy of rescission, the potential breaching
party might regard it as worth its while to take a risk and breach the
contract.11 The potential breaching party might calculate that the non9. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568,
573-74 (2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105
MICH. L. REV. 559 (2006); Gareth Jones, The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of
Contract, 99 L. Q. REV. 443 (1983); Andrew Phang & Pey-Woan Lee, Restitutionary and
Exemplary Damages Revisited, 19 J. CONTRACT L. 1, 39 (2003). Cf. FH 20/82 Adras Bldg.
Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones Gmbh, 42(1) IsrSC 221, 267-268 (1988), reprinted in 3
RESTITUTION L. REV. 235 (1995).
10. Even under a no-rescission regime, there may be several factors that may mitigate a
party’s inclination to deliberately breach the contract. First, the contract may provide that
the damages paid by the breaching party carry increased interest rates as a penalty intended
to reduce the desirability of the breach. Secondly, the potential breaching party should
factor the potential incurring of litigation costs and attorney’s fees should the aggrieved
party pursue full-scale litigation. Finally, awarding punitive damages may deter deliberate
breaches. It is true that courts are authorized to impose punitive damages which, as the
name suggests, are thought of as a means of deterrence. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729
S.W.2d 768, 864 (Tex. App. 1987) (―Where the conduct of a party is of such a nature that
similar behavior should be discouraged, the court can award punitive damages.‖); see also
Pey-Woan Lee, Contract Damages, Corrective Justice, and Damages, 70 MODERN L. REV.
887 (2007) (describing contract damages as a form of punitive response to redress moral
injury to another party). However, the remedy of punitive damages is by far more readily
available upon tortious conduct than due to a breach of a contract. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982)
(recognizing the role of insult in explaining the allowance of punitive damages in limited
circumstances of breach such as breach of promise to marry); Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive
Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 207 (1976-77) (restating the presumption that punitive damages are not available in the
standard action for breach of contract). Awarding over-compensatory damages for willful
breaches is another method to combat deliberate breaches. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri BenShahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 MICH L. REV. 1479 (2009).
11. The discussion in the main text focuses on the efficacy of legal remedies to
incentivize the parties to perform their contractual obligations. There may be alternative,
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breaching party would settle the case for partial payment. Alternatively,
the non-breaching party may find it difficult to prove its case with the
existing evidence. In the worst-case scenario for the potential breaching
party, if its counter-party were to succeed in its claim for damages, the
breaching lessee would eventually be compelled to pay the contractual
payments under the lease. Thus, had contract law provided that the
exclusive remedy for a breach of contract was monetary damages, there
would be circumstances where parties to contracts would calculate and find
it worthwhile to breach the contract deliberately.12 Absent the remedy of
rescission parties would be more vulnerable to calculated breaches. This
would undermine the integrity of contracts and their efficacy.
The remedy of rescission can provide an effective deterrent against
breaches of contracts. Where the breach of contract results in depriving the
potential breaching party of its future contractual profits, apart from the
damages due to the non-breaching party, it thwarts the profitability of the
breach of contract in advance.13 The remedy of rescission and the remedy
informal measures that affect a party’s incentives and cause it to perform. Such measures
may be self-enforcing actions taken by the other party, or adherence to market and social
norms in a given community or industry. See generally John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Private Order under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000)
(examining the role of social networks and informal measures in substituting for the formal
legal system in transition economies). For a discussion of the interrelations between the
legal and non-legal incentives to perform contractual obligations see Ariel Porat, Enforcing
Contracts in Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public and
Private Orders, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2469-77 (2000).
12. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 46970 (finding that often contract damages are under-compensatory).
13. As follows from the main text, the remedy of rescission is linked to the remedy of
enforcement. The two are opposing but complementary remedies for the purpose of
implementing the goal of deterrence. As a matter of principle, law and economics scholars
are not daunted by efficient breaches of contract and accordingly have reservations about
the remedy of enforcement. John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for the
Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract,
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Gwyn D. Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1988); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and
the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 630 (1988). These scholars believe that
enforcement is only justified when the non-breaching party is injured because it is precluded
from obtaining a ―unique‖ product, i.e. a product in respect of which the cost of determining
its personal value to the injured party is particularly high in view of the few market
transactions relating to the product. The remedy of enforcement saves the parties and the
judicial system the cost of valuing the damage to the injured party. See Anthony T.
Kronman, Specific Performance, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS LAW 181, 188-89
(Kronman & Posner eds., 1979). According to this economic approach, the purposes of the
remedies of enforcement and rescission are compatible. In a similar vein to the
aforementioned approach to enforcement, it has been argued that rescission compensates the
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of monetary damages thus serve different goals. The latter is primarily a
corrective remedy. It compensates for losses suffered by the non-breaching
party upon a breach of the contract. The former generates deterrence and
reduces the probability of a breach ex ante.14
III. TERMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY
Part II outlined the underlying justifications for a party’s right to
rescind its contract following a contract breach by the other party. This
part turns its attention more specifically to contracts breached upon the
insolvency of the breaching party. The discussion herein will first
emphasize the economic importance of executory contracts for successful
corporate reorganizations. This will be followed by an analytical challenge
of the justifications for rescission through the lens of insolvency and
bankruptcy.
A. The Importance of Executory Contracts
Executory contracts may be extremely important to an insolvent
company. Often the continuation of certain contracts will be the basis for
the entire business operation of the debtor. For example, a contract under
which the debtor obtains communication infrastructure services from its
telecommunication services provider is a contract without which it is
doubtful whether the debtor can continue to conduct its business. As a
practical matter, the continuation of the contract is critical because the costs
and time entailed in negotiating and entering into an alternative contract
might be significant. In these circumstances, entering into an alternative
contract is an impracticable solution for the debtor, in view of its penurious
situation. A debtor that becomes insolvent lacks two things: time and
liquid funds. Any action required to keep its business alive which
consumes these two resources is doomed to failure.
To illustrate the practical importance of preserving executory
contracts, consider a long-term lease. The leased property may be essential
to the business of the debtor. The location of the property, its accessibility
to suppliers and customers, the relatively cheap rental rates, low local tax
injured party for its personal damage by restoring the parties to their pre-contractual position
in circumstances where the cost of determining its personal damage in a hearing on
monetary damages is particularly high. George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the
Tender of Nonconforming Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic
Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 963-68 (1978).
14. Eric Posner argues that the termination of a contract by the aggrieved party is an
effective alternative remedy to pure monetary damages in situations where the breaching
party is judgment-proof. Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1431,
1439-40 (2009).
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rates and more often turn the leased property into a central resource of the
debtor’s business. Accordingly, continuation of the lease or its termination
will have considerable ramifications for that debtor’s economic future.15
Reorganizing a financially distressed debtor requires first and
foremost the continuation of its business operations uninterrupted.16 Any
stoppage or delay in the routine business turnover will impair the practical
ability to rescue the debtor from its financial crisis and return to its ordinary
course of business.17 Operating a going concern involves the business
suppliers on one hand and its customers on the other. Without the
everyday supply of products and services, and without sales, the business
will collapse despite any legal efforts to the contrary. Thus, a legal regime
that aims to salvage financially ailing firms, facilitate their reorganization,
and enhance the collective value available for the creditors ought to qualify
the termination of executory contracts to which a debtor is a party. This
proposition is in accord with the empirical study conducted by Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, according to which qualifying the right to
terminate contracts improves the efficiency of corporate insolvency.18
However, curtailing the right of rescission appears to be at odds with
the fundamental principles of contract law. Contract law entitles an
aggrieved party to terminate the contract upon its breach as a matter of
right. The remainder of this part and the next part will address this
15. Leasing property is characteristic of many retail businesses, especially today in light
of the concentration of consumer purchasing power in shopping malls. These malls are
generally owned by real estate companies, which lease out all the shops in their shopping
malls. Many retail chains therefore conduct the bulk of their activities in leased properties
located in the various shopping centers situated around the country. Smith v. Hoboken R.R.
Warehouse, 328 U.S. 123, 132 (1946); Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp. (In re Circle K
Corp.), 190 B.R. 370, 376 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 1995); Ira L. Herman, The Impact of Bankruptcy
on Commercial Leasing Transactions, in NEGOTIATING COMMERCIAL LEASES 517, 530
(2008); Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 663, 739-40 (2009).
16. At the inception of a reorganization case, the automatic stay against the creditors is
intended to preserve the debtor’s property and facilitate their continued use uninterrupted.
Bankruptcy Code §§ 362, 363. United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Pettit,
217 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000); Computer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Codex Corp., 824 F.2d
725, 729 (9th Cir. 1987); Tringali vs. Hathaway Machinery Co., 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir.
1986); In re Franklin Equip. Co., 416 B.R. 483, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009); Ann H.
Spiotto, The Ultimate Downside of Outsourcing: Bankruptcy of the Service Provider, 11
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 67-68 (2003); Marc Forsythe, United Savings Ass’n v.
Timbers of Inward Forest Associates, Ltd., 20 PACIFIC L.J. 1309, 1311-15 (1989).
17. John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, An Overview of the
Automatic Stay, 22-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2003-2004); Michael L. Cook & Jessica L.
Fainman, The Bankruptcy Code’s Automatic Stay, 905 PRACTISING L. INST. 421, 429-30
(2008).
18. Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart, Caralee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Debt
Enforcement Around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2008).
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apparent tension.
B.

Subsequent Breaches in Bankruptcy

In Part II above I argued that one goal of the remedy of rescission is to
protect the non-breaching party from successive, future breaches of the
contract by the breaching party. That is, the law assigns a low probability
to the future performance of the contract in light of its past infringement by
the breaching party. Yet this probabilistic assumption is predicated on two
factors without which the future protection goal of rescission loses its
persuasiveness.
The first factor that contributes to the low probability of future
performance upon a breach of a contract is that the decision-maker on the
breaching party’s side before and after the breach is identical. Nonetheless,
this outcome is only likely so long as the same people who functioned as
the decision-makers on behalf of the insolvent party at the time of the past
breach of the contract remain the decision-makers upon that party’s
bankruptcy case. The second factor is the assumption that the operating
and financing terms of the breaching party have not improved after the
breach. Thus, its failure to perform once may indicate an increased risk for
the counter-party that defaults by the breaching party may recur.
These two underlying factors change dramatically in bankruptcy.
First, the commencement of a bankruptcy case alters the decision-making
in the debtor firm. Although in Chapter 11 the management remains in
office as debtor-in-possession,19 its operations and decision-making is
nonetheless subject to the close scrutiny of the bankruptcy court. A debtorin-possession bears the functions of a trustee20 and interacts throughout the
case with the creditors’ committee.21 Under such terms of operation, the
management is less flexible and thus it is unlikely that it will voluntarily rebreach the executory contract without an explicit advance approval of the
court. The difference in the decision-making in the debtor upon
bankruptcy is even more conspicuous under Chapter 7, where a newly
appointed trustee replaces the management.22 This change in the operating
conditions reduces the concern of repeated breaches by the debtor party.
The second factor that leads to a low probability of future performance
is the understanding that an insolvency-related breach signifies failure to
comply with the debtor’s contractual obligations because of its lack of
19. Bankruptcy Code § 1101(1).
20. Id. at § 1107(a).
21. Id. at §§ 1102, 1103(c).
22. In other jurisdictions, trustees are appointed even in reorganization cases. See
David Hahn, Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations, 4 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 117 (2004).
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economic resources. When the debtor lacks sufficient cash, it will fall into
arrears in its payments to the counter-party notwithstanding its contractual
commitments. Nonetheless, within bankruptcy, the operating conditions of
the insolvent firm may improve, even if only temporarily. Upon the
commencement of a case, the appointed debtor-in-possession or trustee will
often be able to raise new financing for the routine activities of the
insolvent party. This fresh financing is unavailable to the debtor prior to
the commencement of the case.23 Such financing may produce the requisite
cash flow for the debtor’s contractual payment obligations henceforth.
Given these two differences between the operation of a debtor outside
and inside bankruptcy, the fact that the contract has been breached in the
past, prior to the bankruptcy case, does not entail a heightened probability
that this contract is prone to future breach during the bankruptcy case.24 To
be sure, executory contracts may be breached inside bankruptcy. There are
no guarantees that this will not occur. Yet, the likelihood of a future breach
depends on the facts of each case. That is, whether the debtor will default
on the contract in bankruptcy depends on the particular economic and
financial situation of that specific debtor. The past contractual history of
the debtor is of little significance in calculating the risk of future breach.
Thus, to the extent that the debtor-in-possession or trustee can convince the
court that future performance of the debtor’s contractual obligations is
feasible, the court should not attach much importance to the past breach as
a factor in calculating the probability of future performance of the
contract.25
C.

No Fault Breaches in Insolvency

The second justification for the rescission remedy for breach of
contract is deterrence against potential breaches.
However, this
justification is less applicable with respect to executory contracts breached
23. For a discussion of the facets of this DIP financing see David A. Skeel Jr.,
Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
917 (2003); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993) [hereinafter Triantis II].
24. Indeed, in the pre-Code years, the mere commencement of bankruptcy was
recognized as anticipatory breach of the contract. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. of Illinois v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916). However, the trustee’s privilege of
assuming or rejecting executory contracts under the Code has made this interpretation
incompatible with statutory law.
See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 519-20 (1974); Carl N. Pickerill, Executory
Contracts Re-Revisited, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 63, 70 (2009).
25. Within the framework of the court’s discretion whether to qualify the right of
termination of the contract or not, the court can require the debtor-in-possession or trustee to
provide adequate assurance of future performance of the contract when assuming the
contract. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(b).
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by reason of a debtor’s insolvency.26 Deterrence measures are relevant and
effective only against calculated and willful breaches. As a deterrent
remedy aimed at frustrating bad faith acts, rescission is intended to
eradicate the potential breaching party’s desire to infringe the contract.
A party to a contract may breach the contract either willingly or
without fault. Breaches by virtue of insolvency are often no-fault
breaches.27 Once a debtor faces insolvency and is cash-constrained,
contractual payment breaches will occur due to the debtor’s inability to
pay, regardless of its willingness to uphold its contractual obligations.
Whether the payments are leasehold payments, wages payments to
employees, or payments to its suppliers for goods and services, the dire
state of the insolvent party compels it to infringe its contract. In such poor
circumstances, the thought or desire to breach is simply immaterial.
Terminating contracts breached by reason of financial disability will not
reduce the likelihood of such breaches. If the debtor is financially
constrained and unable to pay, the threat that the contract may be
terminated by the counter-party will not cause the debtor to pay
nonetheless. The debtor will default regardless of the legal consequences.
Accordingly, to the extent the breach was an insolvency-related, no-fault
breach, allowing the non-breaching party to terminate the executory
contract serves no deterrence goal.28
D.

Willful Breaches, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard

Its insolvency state notwithstanding, a party may nonetheless breach
the contract willfully. As it becomes insolvent and thus judgment-proof, a
party is more susceptible to calculated breaches.29 As an insolvent party, it

26. In the general contract law discourse, Ariel Porat has argued that it is justifiable to
moderate the absolute rights of the aggrieved party by introducing considerations of
comparative fault. GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, 982 et seq. (11th ed., 2003);
Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH L. REV. 1397 (2009).
27. Reconciling willful breaches with the qualification of the rescission remedy in
bankruptcy is discussed in Part III.E, infra.
28. Some courts hold corporate agents personally liable for a corporation’s violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s requirement for payment of minimum wages and overtime
compensation, even where the corporate employer entered bankruptcy. See Boucher v.
Shaw, 2009 572 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding managers of bankrupt corporation
individually liable under FLSA) (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511, 1514 (1st
Cir. 1983)); Chung v. New Silver Palace, 246 F.Supp. 2d 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
the non-debtor defendants individually liable under FLSA). The courts discuss primarily
the question whether the automatic stay in bankruptcy enjoins actions against third parties
such as the corporate agents. The courts do not discuss, however, the fundamental argument
raised in the main text—whether insolvency-related, no-fault breaches merit the same legal
sanctions as willful violations of a contract or the law.
29. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
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will not pay all the damages to the other party. Thus, the debtor party will
not internalize all the costs of its breach.30 Moreover, qualifying the right
of the non-debtor party to terminate the contract under bankruptcy law may
exacerbate this moral hazard. Apparently, the insolvent party would be
provided with an incentive to deliberately breach the contract and enter
bankruptcy shortly after. A voluntary bankruptcy filing would immunize
the breaching party from termination.
The severity of this moral hazard differs based on two factors. These
factors are (a) the ease of filing for bankruptcy and (b) the personal cost of
bankruptcy to the debtor’s management. To the extent a voluntary filing
for bankruptcy requires the meeting of certain prerequisites—most notably
litigating and convincing the court that the debtor is insolvent—a deliberate
breach of an executory contract bears a risk to the potential breaching
party. The financially constrained party must take into account the fact that
the counter-party may terminate the contract quickly after the breach,
before the debtor is able to resort to bankruptcy. In this respect, the
fundamental idea of rescission as a deterrent against willful breach applies
forcefully. Until bankruptcy has commenced, the injured party’s right of
termination is unqualified whatsoever. Accordingly, if the potential
breaching party wishes to continue to enjoy the fruits of its executory
contract, it must be careful to avoid willful breaches.31
The personal cost of a bankruptcy filing concerns the control of the
debtor’s operations upon the commencement of bankruptcy. To the extent
the commencement of bankruptcy entails the appointment of a courtappointed trustee, the debtor’s management will pay a heavy personal price
for filing. By filing for bankruptcy the management effectively abdicates.32
It is unlikely that the management of a financially distressed debtor firm
will decide to breach an executory contract willfully and file for bankruptcy
shortly thereafter to save the contract from termination. Sacrificing their
offices and jobs as a direct result of willful breaches is too heavy a price to
pay.
It follows then, that in jurisdictions where the filing for bankruptcy
30. George Triantis discussed another moral hazard created by the bankruptcy law’s
executory contracts rules. Triantis examines the rule allowing a debtor to reject (that is,
breach) an executory contract (that hasn’t been breached prior to bankruptcy) while limiting
the non-debtor party to damages as merely an unsecured claimant. Triantis argues that this
increases the risk of overinvestment in contracts by the prospective insolvent party and
incentivizes the debtor to breach in bankruptcy. Triantis I, supra note 3. Unlike Triantis’s
piece, this essay focuses on the assumption of executory contracts that have been breached
prior to the commencement of bankruptcy.
31. See George G. Triantis, Jumping Ship: Termination Rights in Bankruptcy: The
Story of Stephen Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc., in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 55,
68 (Robert K. Rasmussen ed. 2007).
32. Hahn, supra note 22.
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protection consumes time and requires meeting preconditions, and where
that filing entails change of personnel at the helm, the moral hazard of
willful breaches upon insolvency is insignificant. U.S. bankruptcy law,
however, smoothes the path to voluntary bankruptcy and facilitates quick
and simple filings.33 Also, under Chapter 11, a debtor’s management
remains in office and functions as a debtor-in-possession and no trustee is
appointed.34 Given this legal environment, the potential moral hazard of
willful breaches upon contemplating a bankruptcy filing cannot be
overlooked.
E.

Qualifying Termination in Bankruptcy

The main challenge the courts must face is differentiating between nofault insolvency-related breaches and willful, opportunistic breaches. Only
the latter raise the concern of under-compensatory remedies. In principle,
combating willful breaches may justify the remedy of rescission. It is,
however, impractical for the courts to determine successfully which
breaches are calculated and deliberate and which are not.35 Thus, applying
the rescission remedy is necessarily over-inclusive.36 It would allow the
non-breaching party to terminate a breached contract regardless of the
nature of the breach. Termination is irreversible.37 Given the economic
importance of certain executory contracts to a debtor’s operations and to its
chances of reorganization, termination as a result of no-fault breaches
would therefore constitute an economic waste.
To overcome the over-inclusiveness of termination and its adverse
effects to the policy of reorganization, the law should implement a softer
33. Bankruptcy Code § 301.
34. Id at §§ 1101, 1104, 1107 (trustee shall be appointed only for cause; otherwise the
debtor-in-possession shall control the debtor’s operations).
35. Triantis I, supra note 3, at 701.
36. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990) (discussing strict and lenient enforcement of
contractual obligations); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long Term Contracts,
75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987) (same).
37. One may fathom reversing pre-bankruptcy terminations retroactively upon the
commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy, in a process similar to the retroactive avoidance
of a preference under Bankruptcy Code § 547(b). However, given the courts’ difficulties in
differentiating willful and no-fault breaches, it is questionable whether this alternative
would prove its worth. In addition, it seems to be far-reaching and manifestly impractical to
renew an agreement containing additional affirmative obligations that have not yet been
fulfilled months after this agreement has already been terminated and after the parties have
gone their separate ways. This is different from avoiding the transfer of property, which
does not require the creditor and the insolvent debtor to perform any additional, unfulfilled
obligations in between. When avoiding the transfer of property to a creditor all that is
required is the paying back of the value which was transferred by the debtor in the past and
nothing more.
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remedial system for pre-bankruptcy breaches of executory contracts. The
softer and more balanced approach is to qualify the non-debtor’s party to
terminate the contract, but to require the debtor to cure its defaults as a
precondition to assumption of the contract.38 Requiring the curing of past
defaults prior to assumption effectively makes the non-debtor party whole
while allowing the debtor party a second chance to salvage their contractual
relationship.39 This is precisely the method that has been correctly
implemented by the Bankruptcy Code.40 Curing past defaults is further
discussed in the following part.
IV. CURING PAST DEFAULTS PRIOR TO ASSUMPTION
Part III laid the case for assumption of an executory contract in
bankruptcy notwithstanding its pre-bankruptcy breach by the debtor. To
soften the qualification of the termination remedy the debtor must cure past
defaults prior to assuming an executory contract. This part analyzes
normative considerations both supporting and opposing the curing of past
defaults by a debtor prior to assumption.41 It concludes that the arguments
supporting the cure of past defaults outweigh the counter-arguments.
A.

Curing Defaults in DIP Regimes
Part III raised the concern that in debtor-friendly insolvency regimes,

38. It is impossible to require the debtor-in-possession or trustee to cure all defaults on
a contract at the stage of bankruptcy. Certain financial covenants typically found in loan
instruments, such as maintaining stipulated financial ratios, will inherently be breached by
reason of the debtor’s insolvency. Default on such covenants cannot be cured while the
debtor is in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code identifies this problem and exempts such
contractual defaults from cure prior to the assumption of an executory contract. See
Bankruptcy Code §365(b)(2) (2010).
39. See Stefan Grundmann, The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: A
Market Function Approach, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1583, 1598 (2009) (discussing the concept
of a second chance that is given to a breacher of a contract under German law in contexts
other than bankruptcy).
40. Bankruptcy Code § 365(a), (b) (2010). It has been noted in commentary that,
notwithstanding this statutory provision, in practice the courts often require the counterparty to continue performing the executory contract even though the debtor has not cured its
past defaults. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to
Comparing US and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, in
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW 109, 132 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed. 1994). These authors note that this is also the legal state
in Canada under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, C-36.
41. More than a decade ago, Epstein and Nickles noted that the reasoning behind the
legislature’s requirement to cure past defaults as a precondition for assumption of an
executory contract has not been persuasively explained and clarified. David G. Epstein &
Steve H. Nickles, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s Section 365
Recommendations and the “Larger Conceptual Issues,‖ 102 DICK. L. REV. 679 (1998).
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primarily those in which a debtor-in-possession controls the reorganization
proceedings, there exists the moral hazard of willful breach of contract by
insolvent parties. An insolvent party may breach the contract, even in
circumstances where it has the ability to perform, and follow its own
breach by a tactical voluntary commencement of bankruptcy. To the extent
the termination of contracts is qualified in bankruptcy the debtor is
contemplating having it both ways. It may breach the contract and still not
suffer from its termination.
To ameliorate this moral hazard the debtor should be required to cure
its defaults prior to asserting its right in bankruptcy to assume the
executory contract. Curing the defaults is a soft alternative to termination.
Both root out the debtor party’s opportunistic incentives to breach.
However, given the rigid and irreversible nature of termination, curing the
defaults is the preferred remedy in bankruptcy.
To be sure, requiring the curing of defaults applies to all breached
contracts. As discussed in Part III above, it is difficult and time consuming
to litigate in bankruptcy court and distinguish between a willful breach and
a no-fault insolvency-related breach. Thus, even the latter breach would
require curing the default prior to its assumption. The assumption of
executory contracts and the curing of defaults associated therewith take
place, however, only at an advanced stage of the bankruptcy case. At that
stage the debtor is expected to be able to meet this requirement. Thus,
unlike the termination of the contract upon the inception of bankruptcy, the
over-inclusiveness of this monetary remedy is unlikely to impair the
bankruptcy case.
B.

Curing Defaults in Trustee Regimes

I have argued earlier that in creditor-friendly bankruptcy regimes,
where a trustee ousts the debtor’s management, the moral hazard risk of
calculated breaches upon insolvency is insignificant.42 It follows, then, that
most breaches upon the insolvency of a debtor are likely to be no-fault
insolvency-related breaches.
Nonetheless, even in such a regime,
conditioning the assumption of an executory contract on curing past
defaults is justified. The justification is fairness.
In my view, it is unfair for the law to intervene in the parties’ mutual
contractual setting and force the non-debtor party, who has already suffered
from the debtor’s breach of the contract, to perform additional obligations
to the debtor party without being first compensated for the loss it has
already incurred as a result of the breach.
As analyzed in Part III above, it is indeed appropriate to curtail the
42. See supra Part III.A.
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non-debtor party’s right to terminate where the termination achieves no
purpose. Thus, once all past losses have been remedied any insistence of
the non-debtor party to terminate the contract nonetheless ought to be based
solely on concerns regarding the future performance of contract by the
debtor. In bankruptcy, these concerns are allayed by the requirement to
provide adequate assurance for future performance, which is approved by
the court.43 Thus, no serious justifications for termination of the contract
remain.
However, to the extent that pre-bankruptcy defaults are not cured by
the trustee, the assumption of an executory contract has the effect of
confining the non-breaching party to the contract notwithstanding its own
economic losses. Where the non-breaching party has suffered a monetary
loss as a result of the breach, there is justification for releasing that party
from the contract in order to enable it to seek some compensation through
alternative channels in the market. Relieving the non-debtor party from the
contract allows that party to mitigate its losses by entering substitute
profitable contracts, the performance of which has not been frustrated.44
The non-breaching party is a creditor of the debtor for past defaults.
Assumption of the contract compels this creditor to continue performing its
own contractual obligations notwithstanding the monetary loss it has
already suffered. No such demand is imposed on any other creditor of the
debtor, whether secured or unsecured. Creditors file proof of claims in
respect of past and due claims. Some creditors enjoy priority of their
claims by virtue of perfecting a security interest,45 asserting a right of setoff,46 or a statutory priority accorded to them.47 But none of these creditors
43. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b)(1)(B) (2010). See also In re Fleming Companies, Inc.,
499 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Family Snacks, Inc. 257 B.R. 884, 902 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2001); In re Everest Crossing, LLC No. 09-16664-FJB (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (as yet
unpublished); In re Carlisle Homes, 103 B.R. 524, 538 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988). Courts seem
to be of the opinion that ―[w]hat constitutes adequate assurance is a factual question
determined on a case-by-case basis.‖ In re Gen. Oil Distrib., 18 B.R. 654, 658 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). That assurance ―will be adequate if performance is likely, i.e., more probable than
not.‖ In re PRK Enters., Inc., 235 B.R. 597, 603 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999). Somewhat less
vaguely, the Fifth Circuit has held that courts should consider ―whether the debtor’s
financial data indicate[s] its ability to generate an income stream sufficient to meet its
obligations, the general economic outlook in the debtor’s industry, and the presence of a
guarantee.‖ Texas Health Enter., Inc. v. Lytle Nursing Home, 72 Fed. Appx. 122, 126
(2003). See also William H. Schorling & Robert P. Simmons, Adequate Protection for the
Nondebtor Party to Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297
(1990).
44. David W. Barnes & Deborah Zalesne, A Unifying Theory of Contract Damage
Rules, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 495, 536-37 (2005); Thomas H. Jackson, Anticipatory
Repudiation and the Temporal Element of Contract Law, 31 STANFORD L. REV. 69 (1978).
45. Bankruptcy Code § 724 (2010).
46. Id. § 553.
47. Id. § 507.
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is required to perform any additional obligations to the debtor. They enjoy
a right against the estate that is not accompanied by any continuous legal
obligation on their side.
In contrast, by coercing the non-debtor party to an executory contract
to continue its future performance without the prior curing of past defaults,
the law forces that party to incur additional out-of-pocket expenses without
first making the party whole. Thus, even though payment of past, prebankruptcy defaults to the non-breaching party effectively accords it
priority over other creditors,48 this deviation from the principle of equality
is justified in light of the economic price the non-debtor party suffers
alone.49 Coercing only this creditor to provide future resources to the
debtor without fully compensating the creditor for losses it has suffered
previously is unfair. It hurts the creditor in a fashion not shared by any
other creditor.
C.

Violating the Principle of Equality?

A pre-bankruptcy breach of an executory contract creates a monetary
claim for damages for the non-debtor party. Absent any collateral to secure
it, this claim is an unsecured claim.50 Bankruptcy law’s fundamental
principle of equality requires equal treatment of all unsecured claims.51
Departing from the principle of equality is only justified when there are
proper policy reasons for preferring one creditor over another. Curing past
defaults to the non-debtor party as a precondition for assuming an
executory contract means that it will receive one hundred cents on the
dollar (100%) for pre-bankruptcy claims. Such a payment, at a time when
other creditors are not paid in full, clashes with bankruptcy law’s principle
of equality of distribution.
The argument is that the non-debtor party must file a proof of claim
48. See infra Part IV.C.
49. My position, as explained here, relates only to contracts in which the mutual
obligations are interconnected within the framework of a particular commercial transaction.
It does not relate to a contract which concerns the entire relationship between the parties,
such as an infrastructure contract in which one party undertakes to provide the other party
both installation services and continuing maintenance services. If the party ordering these
services has not paid for the installation of the infrastructure, this will not justify termination
of the routine maintenance services by the provider. The installation service and the
maintenance service are two separate services and should not be linked together ex post
facto. See In re Payless Cashways, 230 B.R. 120 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999); Matter of
Executive Tech. Data Sys., 79 B.R. 276 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1987).
50. But see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 520, 574-75 (1999) (arguing that security interests are but
one form of legal override of mandatory bankruptcy law and that pre-bankruptcy contracting
may justify a similar condonation by the law).
51. Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(2), (b) (2010).
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for its past payments like any other unsecured creditor of the debtor. At the
stage of payment of all claims, the non-debtor party will be paid pro rata
with all the unsecured creditors.
Moreover, even if the non-debtor party were entitled to terminate the
contract absent curing of past defaults by the debtor, the non-debtor party
would still incur the losses of the past defaults. It would not be allowed to
collect its claim thereon. Thus, termination of the contract instead of
continuing performance will not produce any money to the non-debtor
party. In a bankruptcy setting, the monetary remedy of damages does not
operate in conjunction with termination or performance. Therefore, curing
past defaults awards the non-debtor party monetary damages it would not
enjoy otherwise.
While this argument correctly identifies the distributional effect of
curing past defaults, it nonetheless overlooks the fundamental difference
between the non-debtor party and other creditors of the debtor. As
discussed above, only the former is compelled to continue performing its
contractual obligations in bankruptcy.52 This distinction merits in exchange
the unique treatment of compensating the non-debtor party for past
defaults. This does not violate bankruptcy law’s policy of equality.
Comparing the position of the non-debtor party to that of other unsecured
creditors is simply comparing apples to oranges.
D.

Mutuality as a Quasi-security Interest

A requirement to cure past defaults as a precondition for future
performance emphasizes the reciprocity of obligations under a contract.
The concept of reciprocity arises from the respect shown by contract law
for the desire and interests of each contracting party to safeguard itself
against a breach of contract by the counter-party. In other words, the
concept of mutual obligations in a contract reflects a defense mechanism
for the benefit of contracting parties. Under this understanding, the
mutuality constitutes a security interest.53 Alas, the power of this quasisecurity interest is limited and, unlike a full scale security interest, cannot
secure the non-debtor party in every circumstance. Thus, for example, if
the breaching party is no longer interested in the continued performance of
the contract, the intertwining of the correlative contractual obligations
carries no advantage for the non-breaching party. It does not elevate its
claim for breach of the contract to the level of a secured claim.54
Nonetheless, the argument is that in the circumstances under discussion,
where the debtor-in-possession or trustee is interested in assuming the
52. See supra Part IV.B.
53. Schwarcz, supra note 50.
54. Bankruptcy Code § 365(g) (2010). See also Westbrook, supra note 1.
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previously-breached contract and enjoying its value, the interdependence
between all the contractual obligations can benefit the non-breaching party
and act as a de facto security interest, enabling this party to fully recover its
claim from the debtor.
The aspiration of every creditor to protect itself with security
measures for payment is natural and understandable. However, in an
insolvency scenario the private preferences of any party or creditor are
superseded by the collective good of the creditors as a group. If private
actions or contractual arrangements are to prevail in bankruptcy there must
be substantive grounds of fairness or efficiency to justify such primacy.
Absent such independent justifications, bankruptcy law cannot accord
priority to any specific creditor notwithstanding a private contract
purporting to solidify the counter-party’s position vis-à-vis the debtor and
its other creditors.55 Thus, identifying the mutuality of contractual
obligations as a security mechanism in its own fails to advance the case for
curing past defaults absent supportive justifications for such a security
measure. Indeed, a substantive justification for such a security measure
may be the desire to combat the moral hazard of willful breaches, but that
has been already discussed above.56
E.

Ex ante Efficiency

An economic argument supporting the statutory requirement to cure
past defaults as a precondition to the assumption of executory contracts
asserts that the absence of such a requirement may lead to economic
inefficiency ex ante, at the contracting stage. Forcing a party injured by a
breach of contract to continue performing its obligations under the contract
notwithstanding the failure to cure past defaults would entail an even
greater economic risk, which parties to contracts would be forced to
calculate at the contract’s entrance stage. Increasing the economic risk
would deter potential parties from entering into transactions carrying
positive economic values or, at least, would lead the parties to demand
higher consideration in exchange for third-party guarantees. This in turn
would increase the transaction costs of forming contracts and impair the
free flow of economic values in the market.57
Relieving the non-breaching party from its contractual obligations
absent the curing of past defaults is indeed expected to reduce the cost of
55. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1981).
56. See supra Part IV.A.
57. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807 (1998).
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this particular contractual relation.58 However, this argument ignores the
impact of this rule on the cost of transactions with the debtor’s other
creditors. Paying pre-bankruptcy defaults to the non-debtor party awards it
an individual advantage that is denied from the other creditors. As a result
of this individual advantage, the other creditors experience correlative
inferiority and thus will assess the concomitant cost to their contractual
relations and raise their demanded contractual consideration. The costs
saved in one contract are liable to be offset by the corresponding rise in
costs in other contracts. In addition, paying off pre-bankruptcy claims
impedes the prospects of a successful reorganization and thus may further
impair the value of the other creditors’ claims. Saving the costs of
contractual transactions in the economy is, therefore, in doubt. Absent
additional grounds, it seems that the cost of contracts argument per se is
speculative at best.59
V.

PAST DEFAULTS, THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND PRIORITIES

Part IV has shown that normative considerations justify the curing of
past defaults as a condition precedent to the assumption of an executory
contract in bankruptcy.
This part analyzes derivative matters. First, it examines the scope of
the automatic stay and its logic as they relate to the continuation of an
executory contract. Secondly, it discusses the appropriate timing for
judicial decisions pertaining to the fate of executory contracts in
bankruptcy. Finally, it calls for according judicial discretion, upon the
assumption of executory contracts, to limit the non-debtor party’s priority
for pre-bankruptcy defaults. It argues that this priority should be respected
only if that party performs in good faith prior to assumption and avoids
stalling its own performance in the bankruptcy case. These matters are
discussed below.

58. See also Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy
Rules and Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON & ORG. 441 (1999).
59. In the context of security interests the efficiency has been argued to be found in
cost savings of monitoring debtor misbehavior or creditor misbehavior. See, e.g., Douglas
G. Baird, The Importance of Priority, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (1997); Frank H. Buckley,
The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); Saul Levmore, Monitoring
and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Cheol Park,
Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts, 55 J. FIN. 2157 (2000); Randal C. Picker,
Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992); Alan
Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 209 (1989); Alan Schwartz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986).
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Past Defaults and the Automatic Stay

Executory contracts are a double-edged sword. As discussed above,60
a party to an executory contract is the only claimant of the debtor who is
simultaneously also contractually bound to the debtor’s future operations.
The fairness argument requires reciprocity between the debtor and the nondebtor party. Yet, the prompt curing of past defaults is irreconcilable with
the general policy of suspending the payment of pre-petition claims at the
initial stage of the bankruptcy case and delaying the payment to later
stages.61
Fairness notwithstanding, curing past defaults upon the inception of
bankruptcy would impair the fragile state of the debtor and hurt its chances
to reorganize successfully. The automatic stay’s purpose of facilitating a
feasible reorganization of the debtor62 justifies the suspension of payments
of all pre-petition claims63 until the debtor’s estate is liquidated or a
reorganization plan is confirmed by the court. In the early stages of the
case the debtor is mostly cash-constrained. While the debtor may finance
its current operations through DIP financing,64 this financing is not meant
to serve as a source for paying off pre-petition claims.65
Claims arising from the non-debtor party’s default on an executory
contract are no exception to the general bar against paying off pre-petition
claims upon the onset of bankruptcy. The future performance by the non60. See supra Part IV.C.
61. This policy is reflected especially in the automatic stay. Bankruptcy Code § 362
(2010).
62. The other rationale of the automatic stay is to streamline the debtor’s claims and
pay them off in accord with the statutory rules of absolute priority and equality among
unsecured creditors. Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1991);
Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n, Inc.),
880 F.2d 1540, 1545 (2d Cir. 1989); Holtkamp v. Littlefield (Matter of Holtkamp), 669 F.2d
505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. The bar against paying off pre-petition claims does not differentiate between
secured and unsecured claims. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(3)-(6) (2010). The postponement
of payment applies regardless of the claim’s relative priority.
64. Bankruptcy Code § 364 (2010).
65. While discussing the controversial practice of cross-collateralization, George
Triantis noted that ―this arrangement . . . conflicts with the bankruptcy principle of equal
treatment of pre-petition claimants of the same class.‖ Triantis II, supra note 23, at 907.
See also Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1495
(11th Cir. 1992). This practice has been approved only as an arrangement of last resort in
cases where any alternative was unavailable and absent the financing, all creditors would be
worse off. See, e.g., In re Roblin Industries, Inc., 52 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Vanguard Diversified, 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). It follows,
then, that the use of DIP financing may not be used for the mere preferential payment of
selected pre-petition claims. See also Jeff Böhm, The Legal Justifications for the Proper
Use of Cross-Collateralization Clauses in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 59 AM. BANKR. L.
J. 289, 321-22 (1985); Skeel, supra note 23, at 941-42.
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debtor party ought not to disrupt the balance achieved by the automatic
stay.66 Future performance should be provided by the non-debtor party
even though its right to receive payments for past defaults is delayed to a
later stage in the bankruptcy case. Indeed, as discussed in Part IV above,
only when the contract is assumed, the non-debtor party is entitled to be
paid its pre-petition claim. That is the time when the considerations of
fairness and combating moral hazard are factored in, but the formal
decision to assume the contract may be delayed until late in the bankruptcy
case.67
B.

The Timing of Judicial Determinations

Subjecting claims for past defaults on executory contracts to the
automatic stay entails a couple of legal conclusions. First, it merits a
separation between the judicial inquiry concerning the provision of
adequate assurance of future performance and the actual curing of past
defaults. Secondly, it calls for the continuation of executory contracts upon
the onset of bankruptcy, even if the decision whether to assume or reject
the contract is delayed until the confirmation of a reorganization plan.
1.

Separating Assurance of Future Performance from Curing Past
Defaults

The curing of past defaults, alongside the formal decision whether to
assume an executory contract, may be delayed to an advanced stage of the
bankruptcy case - the confirmation of a reorganization plan.68 This stage
may take place several weeks, even months, after the commencement of the
bankruptcy case.
The performance of the executory contract by both sides, on the other
hand, is continuous throughout the life of the contract. The non-debtor
party is entitled to limit its additional exposure to non-performance by the
debtor party prior to any performance on its part.69 Thus, the trustee or
66. Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code stays the termination of executory
contracts. See, e.g., In re Circle K Corp., 190 B.R. 370, 376-77 (9th Cir. BAP 1996); In re
Clearwater Natural Resources, L.P., 421 B.R. 392 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2009).
67. See infra Part V.B.2.
68. This rule is applicable in cases under Chapters 9, 11, 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, that is, the restructuring chapters. Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(2) (2010). However, in
a liquidation case under Chapter 7 of the Code, the time period for the trustee to decide
whether to assume a contract or to reject it is within 60 days after the order for relief. Id. at
§ 365(d)(1). With respect to unexpired leases of nonresidential real property, the Code sets
the time limit of 60 days after the order for relief for a decision whether to assume or reject
the lease in cases under all aforementioned chapters of the Code. Id. at § 365(d)(4).
69. See supra text accompanying Part IV.C.
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debtor-in-possession must provide adequate assurance of future
performance of the debtor’s obligations under the contract immediately
upon the inception of the bankruptcy case. While the curing of past
defaults as a condition for assumption comes into play late in the case,
securing additional performance by the non-debtor party merits assurances
of reciprocal performance by the debtor party at all stages of the case.70
These two matters are dealt with separately, and the failure to provide
either one should preclude the continued performance by the non-debtor
party.
The Bankruptcy Code follows suit, albeit in a formally different
fashion. The Code requires both the provision of adequate assurance of
future performance and the cure of past defaults only as of the time of
assumption of the contract.71 With respect to the pre-assumption period,
the Code requires the trustee to perform all the debtor’s obligations under
an executory contract or unexpired lease until the assumption or rejection
of that contract or lease.72 The combination of the Code’s provisions leads
to the desired statutory requirement—a continuous demand of undisrupted
current and future performance of the debtor’s contractual obligations in
exchange for the ongoing non-debtor’s performance.
2.

Continuation of Executory Contracts Prior to Assumption

A second, and related, legal conclusion derived from the application
of the automatic stay to claims for past defaults on executory contracts is
that the continuation of the contract cannot be dependent on a prompt
decision to assume the contract. While this decision is the legal trigger for
paying off past defaults, the decision whether to assume or reject an

70. Adequate assurance may be provided in the form of a guarantee, or through the
obtaining of DIP financing for the current expenses of the debtor.
71. Bankruptcy Code § 365(b)(1)(C) (2010) (―[T]he trustee may not assume such
contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption . . . the trustee . . . provides adequate
assurance of future performance under such contract or lease‖ (emphasis added)).
72. Id at § 365(d)(3), (10). These two subsections apply to unexpired leases of
nonresidential real property and unexpired leases of personal property. It is disputable
whether the statute applies similarly to unexpired leases of residential real property and
executory contracts other than leases. See Robert Laurence, At Home with the Bankruptcy
Code, 61 AM. BANKR. L. J. 125 (1987); Daniel Morman, Leases of Personal Property in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies – An Overview of 11 U.S.C. §365(D)(10), 23-May AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 36 (2004) (exploring the history, prerequisites and applications of this statute). But
see NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984) (―If the debtor-in-possession
elects to continue to receive benefits from the other party to an executory contract pending a
decision to reject or assume the contract, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the
reasonable value of those services . . . which, depending on the circumstances of a particular
contract, may be what is specified in the contract.‖ (internal citations omitted)). See also In
re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 954-55 (1st Cir. 1976).
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executory contract considers first and foremost the potential economic
value of the contract to the debtor’s business.73 Examining the overall
value of a contract for the debtor’s business may require time. Thus, the
Code’s flexibility and its grant of an extended period of time to decide
whether to assume or reject the contract are correct.
It follows that, upon the inception of bankruptcy, no final and formal
decision as to whether to continue the contractual relationships of the
debtor will be made. Nonetheless, in order to facilitate such a decision
later on, the law must limit the non-debtor’s power to terminate the contract
immediately due to past non-payments.74 The continuous performance of
the contract is a condition precedent for any decision to assume it.
C.

Limiting the Priority of Past Defaults

The analysis in Part IV above supported the requirement to cure past
defaults prior to the assumption of an executory contract. To the extent the
trustee or debtor-in-possession assumes the executory contract upon the
confirmation of a reorganization plan, past defaults are to be paid ahead of
other pre-petition claims.75
The Bankruptcy Code lists several priority claims76 and mandates that
these claims must be paid or treated prior to the court’s confirmation of a
reorganization plan.77 Effectively, the requirement of curing past defaults
accords the non-debtor party to an assumed executory contract a similar
priority over other unsecured claims.78
73. Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com
Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, 8 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 309 (2000) (analyzing the assumption, assignment, and rejection
of licenses and agreements relating to intellectual property); Westbrook, supra note 1, at
231-32.
74. This is achieved by the automatic stay. See also supra at Part V.A.
75. See supra text accompanying Part IV.C.
76. Bankruptcy Code § 507(a) (2010).
77. Id. at § 1129(a)(9). Of these priorities, administrative expenses and claims arising
in an involuntary case between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the earlier of the
appointment of a trustee or the order of relief must be paid in cash. Id. at §§ 502(f), 503(b),
507(a)(1), (2), 1129(a)(9)(A). The priority claims listed in section 507(a)(3)-(7) of the Code
shall be paid in cash unless the class of claims of each such priority voted to accept the
reorganization plan and the plan allocates each claimant of that class deferred cash
payments of a value equal to the allowed amount of such claim. Id. at § 1129(a)(9)(B).
78. The Supreme Court regarded the cure of past defaults as an administrative expense,
which is one of the various statutory priorities. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S.
513, 531-32. If defaults are not cured promptly upon assumption, they nonetheless receive
the prioritized status of administrative expense. In re America the Beautiful Dreamer, Inc.
(as yet unpublished), 46 BANKR. CT. DEC. 174, 3-4 (2006). See also Brian Leepson, A Case
for the Use of a Broad Court Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12
BANKR. DEV. J. 775 (1996) (exploring the way the Bankruptcy Code is to balance competing
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I propose conditioning the priority payments of past defaults on the
non-debtor good faith performance. This would create a constructive lever
for securing the cooperation of the non-debtor party in performing the
executory contract. By operation of bankruptcy law, the non-debtor party
must continue performing its obligations under the contract throughout the
case. As discussed earlier, its power to terminate the contract upon the
inception of bankruptcy has been justifiably curtailed.79 Nonetheless, the
non-debtor party may stall its performance, disrupt the ordinary course of
the debtor’s business, and adversely affect the latter’s reorganization
efforts.80
Bankruptcy law should be amended to confer discretion to the
bankruptcy courts to disallow the priority benefit for past defaults. The
court may disallow this priority in circumstances where it is convinced that
the non-debtor party, despite being provided assurance of future
performance, failed to perform in good faith its obligations under the
contract. Any delay tactics or other non-cooperative behavior by the nondebtor party may backfire and leave it with only an unsecured claim for the
debtor’s pre-petition defaults.81
This proposed amendment shall limit the non-debtor party’s rights at
the back-end of the bankruptcy case. Such limitation can serve as a selfenforcing measure that will encourage the non-debtor party to perform and
cooperate with the debtor in good faith. By no means does this proposed
limitation impair the non-debtor party’s rights. To the extent it performs its
contractual obligations, it shall receive full payment of past defaults.
Hence, the proposed amendment is both fair to the non-debtor party and
incentivizes it to continue the executory contract without creating artificial
intervals.
This proposal is likely to further facilitate successful
debtor-creditor interests); Yaad Rotem, Pursuing Preservation of Pre-Bankruptcy
Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy Law’s Self-Executing Mechanisms, 5 BERKELEY BUS.
L. J. 79, 103-104 (2008) (arguing for a rigid time frame cap on reorganizations); Charles J.
Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
75 (1991) (studying the problem of emergency orders entered early in Chapter 11
reorganizations).
79. See supra at Parts III, IV.
80. See e.g. Bussel & Klee, supra note 1515, at 719; John T. Gregg, Compelling NonDebtor Suppliers to Perform under Executory Contracts, 27-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (June
2008) (describing the factors compelling non-debtor suppliers to perform); Triantis I, supra
note 3, at 700-02 (discussing possible motives for non-compliance with the contractual
terms).
81. Similarly, to the extent the non-debtor party’s behavior shall frustrate the
performance of the executory contract and hence the ability of the trustee or debtor-inpossession to assume the contract, the non-debtor party risks ending up as a mere unsecured
claimant based on the debtor’s pre-petition breaches of the contract. Any executory contract
not assumed is deemed rejected. Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(1), (4) (2010). A claim of a
non-debtor party to a rejected executory contract based on the debtor’s pre-petition defaults
constitutes an unsecured claim. Id. at § 365(g).
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reorganizations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the contours of assumption of an executory
contract in bankruptcy. Particularly, it questioned the justification for the
rescission remedy with respect to such contracts.
The paper has shown that the two primary justifications for rescission
in contract law, preventing recurring breaches and ex ante deterrence of
potential breachers, lose force in bankruptcy. The operational environment
in bankruptcy reduces the concern of recurring breaches. As for
deterrence, in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime, pre-bankruptcy
defaults on a contract are likely to be no-fault, insolvency-related defaults,
against which deterrence is irrelevant. In a debtor-friendly bankruptcy
regime, breaches may be either no-fault breaches or willful breaches.
Given, however, the rigid, irreversible nature of termination on one hand
and the economic importance of executory contracts to reorganization on
the other, the paper argued in favor of a softer remedy.
The soft alternative for termination is the assumption of the contract,
despite its breach, provided that upon assumption the debtor cures its prebankruptcy defaults. The paper has shown that in addition to its
constructive role of combating willful breaches, curing past defaults is fair
to the non-debtor party and consistent with the distribution rules of
bankruptcy.
The paper supported the Bankruptcy Code’s policy of subjecting
claims for pre-bankruptcy defaults on executory contracts to the automatic
stay until the later assumption of the contract. It further proposed that the
non-debtor’s right to full payment of past defaults upon assumption of the
contract be subject to judicial discretion in circumstances where that party
stalled its performance in bad faith and hurt the debtor’s reorganization
efforts.

